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Abstract. Traditionally, there are two methods to implement anony-
mous channels: free-route networks like onion routing and cascade net-
works like mix network. Each of them has its merits and is suitable for
some certain applications of anonymous communication. Both of them
have their own drawbacks, so neither of them can satisfy some applica-
tions. A third solution to anonymous channels, Klein bottle routing, is
proposed in this paper. It fills the gap between onion routing and mix
network and can be widely employed in anonymous communication.
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1 Introduction
Anonymous (communication) channel is a very useful tool in e-business, e-
government and other cryptographic applications, which often require anonymity
and privacy. In an anonymous channel, the messages are untraceable, so can be
transmitted anonymously. Traditionally, there are two methods to implement
anonymous channels: onion routing [5, 6, 1] and mix network [4, 8, 13, 12, 11].
Onion routing is an anonymous routing mechanism. It employs free-route
mechanism and decryption chain. A node in an onion routing communication
network can send a message to any node in the network with a connection to
it. The sender can flexibly choose any route from all the connections between
him and the receiver. A decryption chain is employed to mask each message
packet when it is transmitted. In a packet, a message is encrypted layer by layer
using the public keys of all the routers on its route and the receiver. Each layer
of encryption is just like a layer of onion skin, which encrypts the encrypted
packet for a router and the identity of the next router. Given a message packet,
each router unwraps a layer of encryption by decrypting the message packet
using its private key, finds out the identity of the next router and forwards
the unwrapped message packet to the next router. When a packet is routed by
each router together with a large number of other packets, the onion structure
and decryption chain prevent it from being traced. Onion routing is flexible
and can be employed in various anonymous communication applications like
anonymous email and anonymous browsing when verifiability of correct routing
is not required. However, onion routing has two drawbacks. Firstly, it is not
verifiable and there is no guarantee that no message packet is lost or tampered
with as all the existing public verifiability mechanism in anonymous channels
are re-encryption oriented. Secondly, untraceability depends on communication
traffic in the network and traffic analysis can always get some hint about a
message packet’s route unless each node sends a packet to every other node
during transmission of this packet.
Strictly speaking, mix network is not a routing mechanism as there is only
one unique route and one unique receiver in a mix network. This routing mecha-
nism is also called cascade network. Multiple fixed nodes are stationed in a fixed
order and form a fixed route called a mix network. Each sender encrypts and
submits his message to the first node in the mix network. After all the senders
have submitted their messages, each node in the mix network take turns to re-
encrypt and shuffle them. The last node outputs the repeatedly re-encrypted and
shuffled messages to the receiver. The receiver can read the messages after they
are decrypted but cannot link them to their senders. Mix network is usually em-
ployed in special anonymous communication applications transmitting a batch
of messages to a unique receiver like e-voting [10] and anonymous e-auction [14].
As every sender sends a message through the unique route to the unique receiver
in a mix network, there is no concern for traffic analysis. As re-encryption in-
stead of decryption-chain is employed to mask the packets, a mix network can be
publicly verified to have transmitted every message without tampering with it.
However, mix network is not flexible as a sender cannot freely choose receiver or
route. Therefore, mix network is not a general solution to anonymous channels
and can only be employed in special applications like e-voting and e-auction.
When general and flexible anonymous channel with public verifiability is
required (e.g. for insured anonymous email), neither onion routing nor mix net-
work can be applied. So a third type of anonymous channel is needed in this
circumstance, which combines merits of the two types of traditional anonymous
channel and overcomes their drawbacks. In this paper flexible routing in onion
routing and re-encryption masking in mix network are combined to design a
flexible and publicly verifiable general implementation of anonymous routing.
It is called Klein bottle routing. The idea of applying re-encryption masking
to anonymous routing was independently proposed by Gomulkiewicz et al [9].
Their proposal is a modified onion routing scheme to prevent repetitive attack.
Danezis pointed out in [2] that the routing scheme in [9] is vulnerable to an
interception-insertion attack. Our proposal in this paper is a new type of anony-
mous channel with its own security model and properties. Our new solution fills
the gap between onion routing and mix network. Moreover, our scheme can be
easily modified to prevent the attack in [2].
Contribution of this paper is as follows. Firstly, security of anonymous routing
is modeled. A basic requirement for anonymous routing, isolated anonymity, is
defined. Secondly, an encryption algorithm, ElGamal encryption with universal
re-encryption and n-out-of-n distributed decryption, is designed as a variant of
the ElGamal encryption algorithm with universal re-encryption [7]. Then Klein
bottle routing is designed. In Klein bottle routing, to enable re-encryption of a
packet without knowledge of the receiver’s public key, the ElGamal encryption
algorithm with universal re-encryption and n-out-of-n distributed decryption
are employed. As Klein bottle routing is a flexible routing scheme, there is no
practical method to completely prevent traffic analysis. However, measures can
be taken to reduce the harm of traffic analysis. For example, to make traffic
analysis more difficult, in Klein bottle routing the size of a message packet is
not changed when it is transmitted. Finally, security of Klein bottle routing
is analysed. It is firstly formally proved to be isolatedly anonymous, namely
anonymous when traffic analysis attack is not taken into consideration. It is
then illustrated to be flexible, publicly verifiable and to resist traffic analysis
based on packet size statistics.
2 Security of Anonymous Routing
In an anonymous routing system, each message is transmitted in the form of a
packet, which contains two parts: encrypted data and encrypted routing infor-
mation. The encrypted data is the encryption of the transmitted message, while
the encrypted routing information is the encryption of the routers’ identities.
When a message s is sent by sender S through routers N1, N2, . . . , Nm to re-
ceiver R, it is transmitted in a packet chain p0, p1, . . . , pm where pi is the packet
sent by Ni to Ni+1. (S is regarded as N0 and R is regarded as Nm+1) A basic
requirement for anonymity in an anonymous routing system is raised in the new
definition as follows..
Definition 1 An adversary randomly chooses two input packets p1 and p2 for
a router to route, then the router selects i from {1, 2} and routes pi to an out-
put packet p′. The communication channel is isolatedly anonymous if given p′,
without the router’s help the adversary can output i with a probability no more
than 0.5 + ² and ² is negligible.
Isolated anonymity is only a basic requirement for anonymity without con-
sidering traffic analysis. In practice, anonymity requirement in a communication
network is more sophisticated. When an attacker can monitor all the traffic in
a communication network, he can perform a traffic analysis, which takes into
account the time each packet is transmitted between two routers. The attacker
can try to analyse which of all the packets transmitted in the network are more
likely to contain the same message. Obviously, isolated anonymity is necessary
but not sufficient to guarantee anonymity, since it cannot guarantee that no
message can be traced when traffic analysis is used. For example, when only
one message is transmitted in the network in a long enough time period, traffic
analysis definitely reveals its route. In another example, in most onion routing
schemes an observer monitoring the traffic can tell how far each packet is from
its destination according to its length. This advantage enables the observer to
perform a simple but effective traffic analysis attack. For example, if a router
receives a message packet with n routers to pass and after a long enough pe-
riod only sends out one message packet with n− 1 routers to pass, the observer
can link these two packets and deduce that they contain the same message. As
the traffic in a network is variable and complicated, traffic analysis is complex
and difficult to formally define. Various analysis methods on the traffic might
be effective depending on distribution of the routers, their connections and the
traffic. So anonymity in a general and practical anonymous channel is difficult to
precisely define when traffic analysis is involved. In this paper it is only required
that the changing packet size based traffic analysis attack against anonymity
is prevented, so that isolated anonymity can be achieved. More sophisticated
traffic analysis attack is not considered in the relatively simple secuirty model
in this paper.
Validity and public verifiability of routing are also important. A dishonest
router may discard or tamper with a message packet. To publicly guarantee
validity of routing of every packet, each router must be publicly verified to
strictly follow the routing protocol when routing all the packets passing him.
More precisely, each router must prove that each of its input packets is routed
to one of its output packets containing the same message, which must be publicly
verifiable.
3 Encryption Algorithm
With Klein bottle routing, re-encryption instead of decryption chain is employed
to mask the packets in a communication channel. There are two advantages of
re-encryption based masking. Firstly, validity of re-encryption of a packet can be
publicly proved and verified without revealing its route. Secondly, re-encryption
inherently keeps the size of the packets constant. However, there are some chal-
lenges to application of re-encryption to anonymous routing. Firstly, anonymity
of the communication channel requires that the identities of the receiver and
the routers must remain secret. So re-encryption of a packet must be performed
without knowing who will decrypt it. That means re-encryption must take place
without knowledge of the public key. Secondly, any part of a packet cannot be
encrypted or re-encrypted with a single public key, otherwise the owner of the
corresponding private key can trace the packet.
To implement re-encryption based masking in Klein bottle routing and re-
spond to the two challenges, distributed decryption [3] is applied to the ElGamal
encryption with universal re-encryption in [7]. Combination of these two tech-
niques guarantees that re-encryption based masking can be implemented without
compromising anonymity as re-encryption is performed without public key and
recovering the private key to trace a packet needs collusion of all the private key
share holders.
3.1 An Employed Cryptographic Primitive: Universal
Re-encryption
Universal re-encryption [7] is a cryptographic primitive to be modified and
adopted in this paper. The original ElGamal encryption algorithm is modified in
[7], such that re-encryption can be performed without knowledge of public key.
It is as follows.
– Key generation
Large primes p and q are chosen, such that q is a factor of p − 1. G is the
subgroup of Zp with order q. g is a generator of G. The private key x is
randomly chosen from Zq, while the public key is y where y = g
x. Unless
specified, all multiplication computations are with modulus p.
– Encryption
A message m is encrypted into c = E(m) = ((a0, b0), (a1, b1)) =
((myr0 , gr0), (yr1 , gr1)) where r0 and r1 are randomly chosen from Zq.
– Decryption
Given a ciphertext c = ((a0, b0), (a1, b1)), the decryption party calculates
m0 = a0/b
x
0 and m1 = a1/b
x
1 . If m1 = 1, m0 is output as the message. If
m1 6= 1, decryption fails and c is declared as an invalid ciphertext.
– Re-encryption
Given a ciphertext c = ((a0, b0), (a1, b1)), a party without knowledge of y
can calculate c′ = RE(c) = ((a′0, b
′
0), (a
′
1, b
′
1)) = ((a0a
r′
0
1 , b0b
r′
0
1 ), (a
r′
1
1 , b
r′
1
1 ))
where r′0 and r
′
1 are randomly chosen from Zq. c
′ is a re-encryption of c
where RE() denotes the re-encryption function.
3.2 A New Encryption Algorithm: ElGamal Encryption with
Universal Re-encryption and n-out-of-n Distributed Decryption
Note that the universal re-encryption mechanism in [7] does not change the
keys of ElGamal encryption algorithm (private key x and public key y = gx),
so the distributed decryption mechanism of ElGamal encryption in [3] can be
applied. The only difference is that n-out-of-n decryption is employed in this
new encryption algorithm while k-out-of-n threshold decryption (k < m) is
employed in [3]. ElGamal encryption with universal re-encryption and n-out-of-
n distributed decryption is designed as follows.
– Key generation
Key sharing parties A1, A2, . . . , An are chosen. Each of them, Ai, selects an
integer xi from Zq as his private key and publishes his public key yi = g
xi .
The encryption key is y, which is the product of the public keys of all the
parties:
∏n
i=1 yi. The corresponding decryption key is x =
∑n
i=1 xi, which is
shared among the sharing parties with an n-out-of-n threshold.
– Distributed decryption
A ciphertext c = ((a0, b0), (a1, b1)) encrypted with y is decrypted in the
following way.
1. Each Ai calculates d0,i = b
xi
0 and d1,i = b
xi
1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2. m0 = a0/
∏n
i=1 d0,i and m1 = a1/
∏n
i=1 d1,i are calculated. If m1 = 1,
m0 is output as the message. If m1 6= 1, decryption fails and c is declared
as an invalid ciphertext.
Later in this paper, the following notations are used to describe ElGamal
encryption with universal re-encryption and n-out-of-n distributed decryption
when it is employed in our masking and routing mechanism.
– Routers N1, N2, . . . , Nm and receiver R are the decryption key shares.
– Function EN1,N2,...,Nm,R(s) stands for encryption of message s with a public
key, which is the product of the public keys of N1, N2, . . . , Nm and R
3.
– Function RE(c) stands for universal re-encryption of ciphertext c.
– Function Di(c) denotes partial decryption of ciphertext c =
((a0, b0), (a1, b1)) using Ni’s private key: Di(c) = ((a0/b
xi
0 , b0), (a1/b
xi
1 , b1),
which is Ni’s operation in distributed decryption of c.
– Function DR(c) denotes partial decryption of ciphertext
c = ((a0, b0), (a1, b1)) using R’s private key xR: DR(c) =
((a0/b
xR
0 , b0), (a1/b
xR
1 , b1)).
Obviously, DR(Dm(Dm−1(. . . (EN1,N2,...,Nm,R(s))) . . .) = s.
Anonymity of Klein bottle routing depends on a property of this new en-
cryption system: semantic security under re-encryption. The original universal
re-encryption function in [7] has been proved to be semantically secure under
re-encryption. However, the definition and proof of semantic security under re-
encryption in [7] are not suitable in this paper because of the following two
reasons.
– Klein bottle routing applies distributed decryption to the original encryption
scheme in [7]. So knowledge of some of the partial private keys must be
considered when analysing semantic security.
– In the definition of semantic security in [7], it is assumed that the adversary
generates the input ciphertexts and knows the encryption details. We be-
lieve that it is unnecessary to make this complex assumption in Klein bottle
routing as participants like routers may know nothing about generation of
the input ciphertexts. So we do not adopt this assumption and our definition
is more general.
Semantic security under re-encryption of the ElGamal encryption system with
universal re-encryption and n-out-of-n distributed decryption is defined and
proved in this section in regard of routing application. To introduce semantic
security under re-encryption, a game is introduced in Fig 1.
Definition 2 The ElGamal encryption with universal re-encryption and n-out-
of-n distributed decryption with re-encryption function RE() is semantically se-
cure under re-encryption if the adversary can win the game in Fig 1 in polyno-
mial time with a probability no more than 0.5 + ² and ² is negligible.
Theorem 1. The ElGamal encryption with universal re-encryption and n-out-
of-n distributed decryption is semantically secure under re-encryption.
3 Note that the ElGamal encryption system with universal re-encryption and n-out-
of-n distributed decryption is employed. So N1, N2, . . . , Nm and R can cooperate to
decrypt any ciphertext encrypted with the product of their public keys.
1. An adversary is given two public keys y1 and y2; all the partial public
keys y1,1, y1,2, . . . , y1,n1 and y2,1, y2,2, . . . , y2,n2 such that y1 =
∏n1
i=1
y1,i and
y2 =
∏n2
i=1
y2,i. The adversary may know at most n1 − 1 partial private keys
among {x1,1, x1,2, . . . , x1,n1} and at most n2 − 1 partial private keys among
{x2,1, x2,2, . . . , x2,n2} where yj,i = g
xj,i . Thus the adversary has not any knowl-
edge of the two private key x1 and x2 where x1 =
∑n1
i=1
x1,i and x2 =
∑n2
i=1
x2,i.
2. The adversary chooses two ciphertexts c1 and c2 encrypted with y1 and y2 re-
spectively.
3. A challenger randomly selects i from {1, 2}.
4. The challenger calculates c′ = RE(ci) and sends it to the adversary while keeping
i secret.
5. The adversary is asked to output i.
Fig. 1. the game for semantic security of re-encryption
Proof: Suppose ci = ((ai,0, bi,0), (ai,1, bi,1)) and c
′ = ((a′0, b
′
0), (a
′
1, b
′
1)) =
((ai,0a
r′
0
i,1, bi,0b
r′
0
i,1), (a
r′
1
i,1, b
r′
1
i,1)) where r
′
0 and r
′
1 are randomly chosen from
Zq. If the adversary can win the game in Fig 1 in polynomial time with a
probability 0.5 + ² and ² is not negligible, then the adversary can tell that
logai,1 a
′
0/ai,0 = logbi,1 b
′
0/bi,0 and logai,1 a
′
1 = logbi,1 b
′
1 in polynomial time
with a probability 0.5 + ² and ² is not negligible. Note that the adversary
does not know private keys x1 and x2 and his only method to tell whether
logai,1 a
′
0/ai,0 = logbi,1 b
′
0/bi,0 and logai,1 a
′
1 = logbi,1 b
′
1 is to solve the decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem. This is contradictory to the widely accepted assump-
tion that DDH problem is difficult to solve in polynomial time. Therefore the
adversary can win the game in Fig 1 in polynomial time with a probability no
more than 0.5 + ² where ² is negligible. 2
4 Klein Bottle Routing
Klein bottle routing is implemented in this section, which employs repeated re-
encryption and distributed decryption instead of a decryption chain. A Klein
bottle is a single sided bottle with no boundary. Its inside is its outside, such
that it contains itself. It is closed and non-orientable, so a symbol on its surface
can be slid around on it and reappear backwards at the same place. We use this
name to emphasize the difference between the new routing scheme and onion
routing. In onion routing, the layers of encryption are removed one by one from
a packet just like the layers of skin are removed one by one from an onion. The
new routing mechanism always maintain the same size and nothing is removed
from it. From its appearance it is impossible to tell how far it has traveled and
how far it is still required to travel. It seems that the packet is traveling on a
tour without start or end as if it is traveling on the surface of a Klein bottle.
A message packet in a Klein bottle routing network consists of a message
and a route list containing the identities of a few routers. Re-encryption and dis-
tributed decryption are employed in Klein bottle routing to implement masking.
Namely, a message is encrypted only once by its sender using a special public
key, which is the combination of the public keys of all the parties on the mes-
sage’s route. In the route list, identity of each router on the message’s route is
encrypted by its sender using a special public key, which is the combination of
the public keys of the routers before that router. In the end of the route list,
identity of the receiver is encrypted by the sender using a special public key,
which is the combination of the public keys of all the routers. When a router
transmits and masks a packet, it re-encrypts and partially decrypts (as its part
of distributed decryption) the message and the route list in the packet before for-
warding it to the next router. Anonymity of the communication channel requires
that identity of the receiver and identities of other routers on the route (except
the next router) are confidential to each router. So the routers must re-encrypt
the messages passing them and their routing information without knowing the
receiver’s public key or other routers’ public keys. Moreover, the decryption key
must be shared such that no single party can decrypt the packets and trace them.
So ElGamal encryption with universal re-encryption and n-out-of-n distributed
decryption described in Section 3 is employed for the routers to re-encrypt and
distributedly decrypt the packets.
Navigation is a new question in Klein bottle routing. Given an encrypted
route list how can a router tell who is the next router to forward a packet to?
How is it possible to prevent a router from knowing the length of the route
and its position on the route? A navigation mechanism called cycling encrypted
route list is designed to navigate the messages when re-encryption masking is
employed. When a message packet is initially generated by the sender, it in-
cludes and encrypts the identities of all the routers to pass and the receiver
in the order of being visited: N1, N2, . . . , Nm, R, which is called the encrypted
route list in the packet. Each router decrypts the first ciphertext in the en-
crypted route list to find the next router’s identity and then cycles the en-
crypted route list one step forward so that the identity of the router after the
next router becomes the first identity in the encrypted route list. For example,
the first router decrypts the first ciphertext in the initial encrypted route list
and finds N2 as the next router, then cycles the encrypted route list so that it
becomes the encryption of N2, N3, . . . , Nm, R,N1. The i
th router decrypts the
first ciphertext in the current encrypted route list and finds Ni+1 as the next
router, then cycles the encrypted route list so that it becomes the encryption
of Ni+2, Ni+3, . . . , Nm, R,N1, . . . , Ni+1. This technique guarantees efficient nav-
igation without revealing how close a router is to the final destination of the
message. If necessary, dummy routers can be added into the end of the route, so
that the absolute length of the route is not revealed.
Suppose the sender is S, the receiver is R and routers N1, N2, . . . , Nm are
employed to transmit a message s. ElGamal encryption algorithm with universal
re-encryption and m-out-of-m distributed decryption is set up for each entity as
described in Section 3 where common p, q, G and g are used. The public key
of R is yR and the public key of Ni is yi. The private key of R is xR and the
private key of Ni is xi. Klein bottle routing protocol is demonstrated in Figure 2
in Figure 2 and described as follows.
1. S chooses the route S − N1 − N2 − . . . − Nm − R for message s
and sends packet (c0, d0) to N1 where N1, N2, . . . , Nm are randomly
chosen routers, c0 is the encrypted message and d0 is the encrypted
route list, which is an m + 1 dimension vector (d0,1, d0,2, . . . , d0,m+1).
More precisely, the encrypted message is c0 = EN1,N2,...,Nm,R(s)
and the encrypted route list is d0 = (d0,1, d0,2, . . . , d0,m+1) =
(EN1(N2), EN1,N2(N3), . . . , EN1,N2...,Nm−1(Nm), EN1,N2...,Nm(R),
EN1,N2...,Nm,R(R)).
2. N1 decrypts d0,1 to find the next router’s identity, N2. Then
N1 sends (c1, d1) to N2 where c1 = RE(D1(c0)), d1 =
(RE(D1(d0,2)), . . . , RE(D1(d0,m+1)), C1) and C1 is a random cipher-
text.
3. Each Ni receives (ci−1, di−1), decrypts di−1,1 to find the next router’s
identity, Ni+1. Then Ni sends (ci, di) to Ni+1 where ci = RE(Di(ci−1)),
di = (RE(Di(di−1,2)), . . . , RE(Di(di−1,m+1)), Ci) and Ci is a random ci-
phertext. Namely, each router decrypts the first ciphertext in the encrypted
route list to find the next router; cycles the encrypted route list one step for-
ward; replaces the former first ciphertext in the encrypted route list with a
random ciphertext and puts it in the end of the current encrypted route list;
partially decrypts, re-encrypts the rest of the packet and sends the packet
to the next node.
4. R decrypts the first ciphertext in the encrypted route list and finds its own
name. He thus knows that he is the receiver. He then decrypts cm and gets
s = DR(cm).
If the absolute length of each message’s route must be confidential, some
dummy routers can be added to the end of the initial route list when the sender
generates the packet. If public verifiability is desired, the following routing op-
erations with public proof and verification can be employed.
1. When a router receives a message packet, he usually does not route it im-
mediately. He waits until the number of message packets he holds is over a
threshold.
2. After the number of message packets he holds is over a threshold, the router
routes them in a random order. We call this routing mechanism batch rout-
ing4.
3. The router has to prove that in the last batch routing the messages en-
crypted in his output packets is a permutation of the messages encrypted in
his input packets. This is very similar to the proof of correct shuffling in a
mix network as both techniques employ batch operation, a random permuta-
tion of the packets and re-encryption masking. So the proof and verification
4 Even if public verifiability is not required, batch routing can be employed to prevent
a simple traffic analysis attack linking an input packet to a router to an immediately
following output packet from the same router.
Fig. 2. Klein bottle routing
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protocol to guarantee correct re-encryption and shuffling in existing mix net-
work schemes like [8] or [11] can be employed. To be used in Klein bottle
routing, the proof and verification protocol is slightly modified to suit El-
Gamal encryption with universal re-encryption and n-out-of-n distributed
decryption.
5 Analysis
Security of Klein bottle routing is analysed in this section.
Theorem 2. Klein bottle routing is isolatedly anonymous.
Lemma 1. An adversary chooses two ciphertexts c1 and c2 in the encryption
system employed in Klein bottle routing where he does not know the private keys
to decrypt these two messages. A challenger randomly selects i from {1, 2} and
calculates c′ = RE(Dj(ci)) where Dj() denotes partial decryption using Nj’s
private key5. Given c′, the adversary can output i with a probability no more
than 0.5 + ² and ² is negligible.
Proof: If Lemma 1 is incorrect, the adversary can output i with a probability
0.5 + ² and ² is not negligible in the game described in Lemma 1. Then the
adversary can use the following algorithm to break semantic security under re-
encryption in the ElGamal encryption algorithm with universal re-encryption
and n-out-of-n distributed decryption.
1. The adversary chooses ciphertexts e1 and e2 and calculates c1 = ENj (e1)
and c2 = ENj (e2).
2. The adversary sends c1 and c2 to the challenger.
3. The challenger randomly selects i from {1, 2} and calculate c′ = RE(Dj(ci))
4. c′ is given to the adversary while i is kept secret.
5. The adversary can output i with a probability 0.5+² where ² is not negligible
as Lemma 1 is assumed to be incorrect.
Note that c′ = RE(Dj(ci)) = RE(Dj(ENj (ei))) = RE(ei). So using this
algorithm the adversary can output i given c′ without knowledge of the private
keys where c′ is the re-encryption of one of the two ciphertexts e1 and e2. This
is contradictory to Theorem 1. Therefore, Lemma 1 is correct. 2
Proof of Theorem 2:
If Theorem 2 is incorrect, an adversary without help of the router can output
i with a probability 0.5 + ² and ² is not negligible in the following game: the
adversary chooses two input packets p1 and p2 for a router Nk, then the router
randomly selects i from {1, 2} and routes pi to an output packet p
′.
Suppose pi contains (ci, di) and p
′ contains (c′, d′) where ci and c
′ are the
encrypted messages in the packets; di and d
′ are the encrypted route lists; di =
(di,1, di,2, . . . , di,m+1) and d
′ = (d′1, d
′
2, . . . , d
′
m+1). So at least one of the two
following events happen.
5 For example, Nj acts as the challenger.
– Given c′, a re-encryption of either c1 or c2, the adversary outputs i such that
c′ is a re-encryption of ci with a probability 0.5 + ² and ² is not negligible.
– Given d′j−1 mod m+2, a re-encryption of either d1,j or d2,j where 1 ≤ j ≤
m+ 1, the adversary outputs i such that d′j−1 mod m+2 is a re-encryption of
di,j with a probability 0.5 + ² and ² is not negligible.
Note that c′ = RE(Dk(ci)) and d
′
j−1 mod m+2 = RE(Dk(di,j)) and the adversary
does not know the private key to decrypt c1, c2, d1,j or d2,j as at least Nk does
not collude with him. So both these two events are contradictory to Lemma 1.
Therefore, Theorem 2 is correct. 2
Theorem 2 illustrates that Klein bottle routing is anonymous if the decryp-
tion key is unknown and traffic analysis is not performed. As n-out-of-n key
sharing is employed, no information about the decryption key is revealed unless
all the routers and the receiver collude. Although traffic analysis cannot be com-
pletely prevented, it is not easy in Klein bottle routing. As dummy routers are
added to the end of each route list, each encrypted route list seems to have the
largest possible length. In Klein bottle routing, each router has three operations
on a message packet: partial decryption, re-encryption and route list cycling,
none of which changes the size of any message packet. So the size of any message
packet is constant when it travels in the Klein bottle routing network. Constant
packet size achieved in Klein bottle routing makes traffic analysis more diffi-
cult. The traffic analysis attack based on monitoring packet size mentioned in
Section 2 can be prevented in a Klein bottle routing based communication net-
work. The public proof and verification techniques in mix network [8, 11] can be
slightly modified and employed to provide public verification of correct routing
when batch routing is employed. So Klein bottle routing is publicly verifiable.
It is the only known publicly verifiable anonymous routing scheme so far. Klein
bottle routing is simple and efficient as it avoids a difficult question in onion rout-
ing: keeping packet size unchangeable when decryption chain masking is used.
The cycling-route-list-based navigation mechanism guarantees efficient naviga-
tion (only one decryption and a small number of re-encryptions are needed to
find the next router) without revealing to the router its position on the route.
To prevent the interception-insertion attack in [2], we
only need a small change to the packet format: the en-
crypted message is c0 = EN1,N2,...,Nm−2,Nm,R(s) and the
encrypted route list is d0 = (d0,1, d0,2, . . . , d0,m+1) =
(EN1(N2), EN2(N3), . . . , EN1,N2...,Nm−3,Nm−1(Nm), EN1,N2...,Nm−2,Nm(R),
EN1,N2...,Nm−2,Nm,R(R)). Namely, one key is deleted from each encryption. Thus
there is a gap in the address list and the inserted address in the attack will
be trapped in the gap and cannot be decrypted. Therefore, the attack can be
prevented.
In Table 1, a comparison between Klein bottle routing and the existing anony-
mous channel implementations is provided. When computation cost is compared,
the number of full length exponentiations are counted. Although the concrete
number of exponentiations cannot be given in Table 1 due to lack of details in
some existing schemes, the cost of the schmemes in the table is similar. It is
clearly illustrated that Klein bottle routing overcomes the drawback of onion
routing and mix network. It is the only solution for general and flexible anony-
mous communication channels.
An interesting property of the new scheme is that it can be easily extended to
support public verifiability. Any exsting re-encryption based public verifiability
mechanism [12, 11] can be easily employed to achieve public verifiability. So the
new scheme is the first technique to support public verifiability in free-route
anonymous networks. In a publicly verifiable free-route network, each router has
to give a public proof of validity of his routing periodicly, while an auditing
authority checks the proof. As the proof is publicly verifiable, any dispute can
be publicly solved.
Table 1. Comparison
scheme general anonymity packet size based publicly cost
& flexible traffic analysis verifiable
onion routing [5, 6] yes informal vulnerable no O(m)
onion routing [1] yes formal invulnerable no O(m)
onion routing [9] yes informal invulnerable no O(m)
mix network [11] no formal invulnerable yes O(m)
Klein bottle routing yes formal invulnerable supported O(m)
6 Conclusion
A new type of anonymous channel, Klein bottle routing, is designed in this
paper. It overcomes the drawbacks of onion routing and mix network and fills the
gap between them. Klein bottle routing is the only flexible general anonymous
channel implementation with public verifiability. It employs batch routing and
keeps the packet size unchangeable to avoid simple traffic analysis attacks.
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